

Current Theses

1. New Dawn in the Arab World

1.1. The revolutionary awakening in the Arab autocracies represents a historic turning point. They belie the legend of Islamism as the only relevant opposition in the Arab countries as well as the contention that Islam is not compatible with individual civil rights.

1.2. With political deals, by which autocrats and dictators deliver oil and natural gas and intercept refugees and, in exchange, get cheap credit and weapons, the EU states have made themselves accomplices of repressive regimes. We call for a new Mediterranean policy oriented to the people's welfare as well as an asylum and migration policy committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Stability cannot be achieved through chumminess with despots.

1.3. The support announced for the Arab freedom movements must be followed rapidly by deeds. Europe can make available to Arab societies some experiences with transition: consultation on drafting new constitutions, the designing of key state institutions and the reform of the security sector, targeted support in the area of economic infrastructure and in the development of free unions, on educational reform, from literacy to the establishment of free universities, and on the advancement of women.

1.4. The EU must open its agrarian markets so that desperately needed jobs can be generated in the southern Mediterranean states.

2. Libya

2.1. Resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council demands an immediate ceasefire. This should be taken seriously and the parties to the conflict must be persuaded to begin negotiations - without political preconditions - because the protection of the civilian population has priority.

2.2. We take a critical view of the performance of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Libyan crisis. A peace-oriented foreign policy looks different. Germany can and should distinguish itself through active diplomacy, economic cooperation incentives and military restraint, including strict adherence to the legally binding prohibition on exporting weapons to areas of tension or to states which violate human rights.

2.3. The intervention in the Libyan Civil War must orient itself to the goal of protecting the civilian population. There is the danger that the violent conflict will escalate as a result of the desired regime change and the protection of the civilian population will become secondary.

3. Crisis in Europe

3.1. The European governments must actively justify a balance between richer and poorer countries as being in the common interest and must campaign for political support for this, because a failure of the Euro would exacerbate the lack of solidarity, revive the striving for spheres of influence and bury, once and for all, the weakly-developed common foreign policy. Appropriate means would be an effective control of the banks, early warning systems and a

governmental investment, interest and tax policy to effectively balance out the financial constraints of weaker countries. Solidarity is not only a burden: European integration benefits everyone.

3.2. National and societal diversity are part of a European identity. Cultural diversity and the right to be different are normality and indeed a gain. We suggest establishing and pressing ahead with a politically pro-active brain-gain-for-all strategy, which promotes both the disadvantaged, with and without a migration background, and opens up opportunities in the job market here *and* in their homelands to immigrants with qualified degrees.

3.3. Frontex ought to be placed under an effective control of the European Parliament. Every asylum seeker is entitled to a serious review of his application. The practice of deporting those seeking protection back to their homelands, with the help of bilateral agreements, violates the EU constitutional law and the human rights charter. Political morality does not come to an end either at national or European external borders.

3.4. The EU must return to a trusting cooperation with Turkey. This requires maintaining the country's accession candidacy. The formula of a "privileged partnership" propagated in Berlin doesn't do this. This snub violates existing contracts and resolutions of the EU and is parochial politics.

4. Interventions

4.1. The Federal Government of Germany has never clearly defined its goals in Afghanistan nor has it made the situation of the Afghan people the focus of the debate. The deployment of the Bundeswehr has long been decoupled from any peace prospects for Afghanistan – if it ever was connected with them. We call for a publicly accessible evaluation of the Afghanistan deployment by independent professionals and consider a rapid withdrawal of the Bundeswehr to be unavoidable. At the same time, Germany should seize new diplomatic initiatives for the pacification of Afghanistan, i.e., through sub-regional cease-fire agreements.

4.2. The political instability in Pakistan is even more dangerous than that in Afghanistan. We ask that after the death of Bin Laden, the chance for a diplomatic offensive towards the Taliban will be used in order to end the war in Afghanistan.

4.3. The „imperial intervention” in Iraq toppled the regime but failed to achieve all the other goals. It fueled political instability, ethno-regional and religious conflicts as well as Islamic terrorism in the region. The removal of the US combat troops could not achieve removing the burden of the ethno-religious fragmentation of the country.

4.4. The norm of the “responsibility to protect” is a civilizing step forward because it prevents dictators from being shielded from the consequences of bloody suppression practices by the immunity of state sovereignty. If, however, this norm is haphazardly applied, it loses credibility. We ask the Federal Government to develop criteria for its voting behaviour in the UN on military interventions as well as for Germany's participation in them.

5. Military Power Security

5.1. The concept of a “comprehensive approach” needs to be reconsidered. We ask that civil and military tasks and mandates in crisis and conflict management be clearly separated again. We take a critical view of the policies - observed since 2010 in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development - of increasingly linking the promotion of projects in Afghanistan to the deployment areas of the Bundeswehr and tying them to a willingness to accept civilian-military cooperation.

5.2. We are also critical of the UN being numbered, besides the EU, Russia and others, among one of many “partners” for NATO. This arbitrariness does not do justice to the world organization. It is the supreme international institution and it alone has the right to authorize deployments of NATO that go beyond self-defense.

5.3. Deployments of the Bundeswehr beyond the tasks of national and collective defense presume a mandate of the UN Security Council. The removal of barriers to “expanded country and allied defense” should not open the door to self-empowerment for military deployments.

5.4. A public debate on the future role, tasks and force structure of the German Bundeswehr is overdue. This is the condition for being able to make a serious and democratic decision on personnel strength, equipment and the financial framework of the Bundeswehr.