

Editors' Comments: Current Developments and Recommendations

Focus on Afghanistan

Afghanistan Policy Failed

The intervention in Afghanistan is going into its ninth year. While US President Barack Obama has announced the beginning of the troop withdrawal in the summer of 2011, still neither this action nor the end of the war are in sight. Despite a massive strengthening of NATO troops, the security situation has worsened and the Afghan government has suffered a loss of legitimacy. One cannot even speak of a defective democracy. The corruption is endemic. *Warlords* and war criminals sit in the government, the last presidential elections were falsified and foreign troops are increasingly feared as occupiers. The Afghanistan policy has failed.

In 2001, the USA drove the *Taliban* from power during *Operation Enduring Freedom* and destroyed the *al-Qaeda* camps. However, it was scarcely possible afterwards to establish functioning government structures outside of the cities. The population perceived the state judiciary and police more as a plague than as a help; both are corrupt and discredited. The *Taliban* and other insurgents were able to fill the vacuum with their own, quasi-state structures, for instance in disputes over property. Thus does the resistance achieve a social foundation. The *Taliban* attack foreign and Afghan soldiers, aid workers and “collaborators” to undermine the international involvement in Afghanistan. Their goals are the withdrawal of NATO, the disempowerment of the Karzai government and a political and social order consistent with fundamentalist views of Islam.

The Taliban fill a vacuum

The western Afghanistan policies lack the central conditions for success, above all competent, organized and legitimized Afghan partners as well as a functional and accepted state apparatus. The goals of the mission remain imprecise: War on Terror, nation-building, fighting insurgents, exporting democracy, reconstruction, support of the government, social reforms – to this day the priorities are unclear. There has been more embroidered rhetoric than a realistic strategy – in retrospect, President Obama has criticized the “muddling through”.

Germans against the combat mission

Meanwhile, over two-thirds of the population in Germany are opposed to the deployment of the Federal Army in Afghanistan. The earlier broad consensus of the parties – with the exception of the Left – is crumbling. Nevertheless the West cannot escape its responsibility for the devastating balance of the intervention and must draw the logical conclusions from the fatal results of its failure. There are no longer any optimal options; each one has its price. The seven experts who are analyzing Afghanistan in this Peace Report are remarkably restrained in their recommendations. Debatable is which option is the least bad: a rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan or the continuation of the involvement with a new strategy? A conditional or an unconditional withdrawal? The end of the battle operations or a continuation with new goals?

New Strategy: Nation Building, Combating the Insurgency and Afghanization

Last year, the Obama Administration decided on a new Afghanistan strategy, so the page might yet be turned. In January 2010 the US allies also followed suit. The state in Afghanistan is to be strengthened sufficiently so that it does not fall into the hands of the *Taliban* and other insurgents. With this in mind, the goal is to create a responsible state and strengthen the Afghan security forces through better training and massive expansion and arming. The new strategy take the steps needed to respond to the failed state development: Without effective and legitimate rule the insurgents will not allow themselves to be pushed back.

Only risky options remain

In addition, the USA and their partners have decided to begin their troop withdrawals from mid-2011. However, they have linked their speed and completion on the condition that the Afghan security forces themselves be capable of ensuring the security, province for province. With this “Afghanization”, the foreign troops are to take a back seat to limit their own losses and minimize the resistance against them.

Strengthening the State and the Security Forces

The new strategy abandons the goal of defeating the insurgents militarily. Rather, it aims at cutting them off from the population. Since the majority of Afghans are opposed to suicide attackers and terrorists, improved governance and development aid should win back the population. Where the insurgents are pushed back militarily, the forced development of a political and material infrastructure should pull the rug out from under their feet.

Withdrawal with conditions

But how realistic is the strategy? Does it draw the correct conclusions from past mistakes and is it based on sustainable assumptions? It is battling against the *Taliban* while, at the same time, some Western politicians signal a readiness to make concessions. It aims at Afghanization, but President Karzai is criticized if he questions certain military operations. The Afghan government should be legitimate, in accordance with the rule of law, and democratic; at the same time the voting fraud of Karzai is accepted. The new strategy aims at the hearts and minds of the Afghan people and wants to strengthen the state, but mentions no conditions for a peace process.

Realistic?

NATO Troops: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?

After nine years of war in Afghanistan the number of civilians killed is at least five times as high as those in the September 11, 2001 attacks. Up to now, there have been 1,748 deaths among coalition troops. Reliable figures for the total number of Afghan victims are not available; estimates for the period between 2001 and 2009 vary between 13,000 and 33,000 victims among the Afghan civilian population. In 2009 alone, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) counted 2,412 civilian deaths. The admission of “war-like conditions” by the German Defence Minister and the appraisal as a “non-international armed conflict” create, according to zu Guttenberg ,“the greatest possible legal protection.” The September 2009 attack on Kunduz, during which civilians died, is now considered as “permissible under international law”. Germany is at war rhetorically, too. Its self-portrait as a civilian

Germany at war

power is evaporating, room for maneuvering is expanding, its own and foreign victims will increase.

Makeshift Stabilization

In dispute – also among peace researchers – is what effects the presence of foreign troops has. Its advocates argue that the troops at least contribute to the stabilization of the government and to the reconstruction of the country even if it is in a makeshift way. A more rapid withdrawal would endanger both and would further worsen the security situation; it would result in a continuation or even an intensification of the civil war and, in the medium term, in the fall of the Karzai government. On the other hand, the massive military presence fuels the violent conflict and thwarts the government's offers of negotiation. Thus, critics would expect the withdrawal of troops to contribute to Afghanistan's stabilization. It would deprive the insurgents of an attractive mobilization resource, to act against "foreign occupiers" and to brand the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan as stooges of the USA and the West. In addition, the pressure on Kabul would grow to dissuade some segments of the insurgents from their battle, with the help of concessions, and to give them a share in power as well as introducing the overdue reforms in order, ultimately, to strengthen the legitimacy of the government.

Protection of the Population

It seems certain to us that neither the continued presence of international troops nor their immediate withdrawal alone can create peace. However, serious consideration of plausibility can be undertaken. Our benchmarks for success of the Afghanistan policy are: protection of the civilian population, decline in the level of violence, creation of the conditions for a political solution and stabilization of the country. The vacuum in reliable governmental structures will be filled either by reformed state authorities – or instead by the insurgents with their efforts at creating order and their alternative justice. Crucial for overcoming the violence are the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Afghan government and the state – that must be at the heart of the policy.

Legitimacy and efficiency

How to do the least harm?

A reliable prognosis on how the level of violence can best be reduced is not possible. All courses of action are connected with high risks, imponderabilities and costs. Responsible development policy is described by *Do No Harm*; this must apply to military interventions even more! Which of the following options will cause the least damage is, admittedly, debatable.

Option 1: The new Afghanistan Strategy as the last Chance

Review the Goals

Whether the new strategy will take hold can be judged on the basis of concrete criteria which their authors themselves have compiled. These criteria permit conclusions about whether the insurgents can be repelled and whether the Afghan state has a chance to win back its lost reputation. So that they will not remain without consequences as did the criteria of the *Afghan Compact* of 2006, independent Afghan and international experts should assess whether these goals can be achieved. Since foreign military forces can only support but not replace the government of Afghanistan, the new strategy cannot be measured by their goals and means, that is, on strengthening troops, but rather of whether it is successful or not.

The criteria are:

- Improved protection of the Afghan civilian population. The indicator for a change is whether, in the next twelve months, the number of civilian victims of violence significantly declines.
- A reduction of the corruption and successes in developing efficient instruments to combat it
- A reform both of the party law to improve the participation of the parties as well as the voting law to rule out voting fraud in the future.
- Strengthening and reforming of the local and national judiciary to give the population an alternative to the quick justice of the *Taliban*.
- A gradual takeover of responsibility in the provinces and a guarantee of security for the population living there from the end of 2010; should this not succeed by mid 2011 in at least three of the provinces without an increase in violence, the “Afghanization of Security” must be considered to have failed.

Improving security

Reducing corruption

Reforming party law and voting rights

Afghanization of security

A precipitous withdrawal is risky

It can neither be ruled out from the outset that the new strategy will effect a change for the better nor that it will only further fuel the violence. Arguing against an immediate withdrawal of troops is that the war would only be “Afghanized” and would take on a different form – similar to what was the case after the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989. At that time, the civil war escalated and Kabul was largely destroyed. Chaos or a victory of the *Taliban* could, once again, transform Afghanistan into a sanctuary for transnational terrorists. In the best case scenario, an immediate international withdrawal would bring about a fragile *modus vivendi* of armed militias. Karzai and his government would lose support and protection and many Afghans accused of collaboration with foreign countries would be exposed to the victor’s desire for revenge. What little progress has been made – the Constitution, education reform and schools as well as the return of some five million refugees – would be undone. Were radical Islamists in Afghanistan once again allowed the triumph of a victory over a big power, this would give them and their anti-Western ideology an enormous boost, which would have fatal ramifications for neighbouring countries.

Civil involvement is central

The speed and the conditions of the withdrawal should depend on whether the development of accepted state structures shows recognizable progress in the next few months. So this option boils down to delaying the withdrawal. The German Federal government decided with the extension of the ISAF mandate in February 2010 to nearly double Germany’s civil involvement for Afghanistan, namely through capacity development in administration and justice. If state building is to be successful this must not remain lip service - and it should be expanded to Pakistan as well. Afghanistan desperately needs help with the development of the judiciary. Development help, on the other hand, is most easily accepted with road construction, with water supply, with access to schooling and with food aid.

Afghan direct responsibility

However, if the foreign NGOs themselves supply the lion’s share of the development aid for services that the Kabul government should be providing, the state will be further weakened. Thus, development should be carried out above all by Afghan entities, also to strengthen them in the eyes of the population. If the political vacuum can be successfully filled, the troops can gradually be reduced under

improved conditions. If this last effort proves unsuccessful, a rapid withdrawal should be begun.

Option 2: End of the Combat Operations

Combat hinders development

The necessity of strengthening Afghan statehood at all levels and of insisting that the central government carry out the desperately needed reforms is not in dispute. However, to assume that the new strategy could yield substantial results within twelve or even 36 months is an illusion. If an effective state is imposed as a condition for the withdrawal, Western troops will need to stay for decades. Nation-building cannot succeed “under fire”. Strengthening statehood benefits conflict resolution but cannot replace it.

The continuation of hostilities limits the political room for maneuvering. The Afghan government can only negotiate when it is not seen as a puppet of the West. Measured by the number of victims, the community of states is creating more insecurity than security. But who still hears the laments of those left behind if it doesn't involve *our* dead? At the latest when, through a military intervention, more people die and fewer and fewer feel protected by it, the end of hostilities is needed.

Combat creates resistance

The foreign troops in Afghanistan are one cause of the escalation of violence. They battle the insurgents, defend and protect themselves, delay defeat, keep a placeholder government in power, train Afghans for war, protect many civilians and kill others. The new strategy will, indeed, strengthen civilian development, but merely serves as support for the military operations. The additional 850 training and protective troops of the German Federal Army are combat soldiers; they accompany the Afghan military in dangerous areas.

Combating insurgency militarily and protecting the population are incompatible. As long as NATO fights it will provoke fear and trepidation but will also strengthen the resistance instead of bringing the *Taliban* to the negotiating table. In the most recent survey by the US Army in Kandahar Province – the key province for the new strategy – 95 percent of those queried opposed further combat against the *Taliban*. In addition, the combat operations in the south have already driven 250,000 refugees into the north - long considered to be safe. *Taliban* are also taking refuge there.

Cease Combat Operations

The support for a corrupt government ultimately undermines the moral basis for the international involvement. The longer NATO fights, the more will the Karzai government seek to distance itself from it in the interest of its own survival; it already opposes the expansion of combat operations today.

The Netherlands and Canada want to end their participation in the combat operations. The German body politic should follow suit. A stabilizing function of the NATO soldiers is most likely to be the case with training and visible protective services – i.e. for convoys, streets and strategic objects, with mine clearance as well as demobilizing, de-arming and reintegration programs. NATO can only win when it gives up combat operations.

Option 3: Negotiations with the Taliban

In the last few months, the necessity of negotiating with the *Taliban* and winning over at least some of them as political cooperation partners has been much discussed. At West Point in December 2009, Barack Obama said that he wanted to support President Karzai in “opening the door for all those who renounce violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens.” The conference in London also endorsed these efforts. Nevertheless it is hard to imagine ending the war through negotiations – the number of violent actors is too great, the control over gunmen and militias is too limited and the conflicting interests between the various ethnic and other groups, and regional powers, not to mention that of Afghanistan’s neighbours, are too pronounced.

Distinct conflicts of interest

Many experts, however, go much further in their recommendations than what Washington and the London conference suggested in this direction. Among them are two authors of this year’s Peace Report, Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, both proven *Taliban* authorities. They advise supporting Karzai’s suggestion of a *Jirga* of national reconciliation and they suggest agreements between Kabul and the individual militias at regional and national level. The leaders of the insurgency are heterogeneous, so many have changed sides in the last thirty years. In addition the majority of the *Taliban* fighters do not identify themselves with the *Jihadists* of the ruthless and internationalist *al-Qaeda*.

Jirga of national reconciliation

The West, itself a party to the conflict, can neither broker accords and agreements on national reconciliation nor guarantee a peace agreement. But it can promote this. Such an understanding does not, indeed, mean a rapid withdrawal of the international troops, but with negotiations and cease-fire agreements it can gain time. Moreover, their withdrawal could be integrated into such a negotiation process. Thereby, the international troops would, admittedly, have to adapt themselves to the requirements and limitations of the Afghan actors. Up until now, all the public statements of the *Taliban* have been opposed to such suggestions. They want to continue their armed battle as long as foreign troops are in the country and fight against the government in Kabul as a corrupt puppet of foreign occupiers.

Afghan actors are central

If negotiations with the *Taliban* are to be successful, some conditions need to be fulfilled. In the first place are security guarantees for former fighters. However, since neither the government nor NATO can guarantee them this in the south, their villages should be allowed to continue to keep weapons for self-defense. Indispensable, in addition, are material incentives and an economic perspective. Moreover, beginning at the province level, groups of insurgents prepared to compromise should share in the power. None of this will be achievable without ideological concessions. For the *Taliban* must be able to persuade their adherents of the concrete advantages of peace talks.

Security, Incentives, Power-Sharing

They will also want to achieve at least some of their goals, above all the withdrawal of foreign troops, effective combating of corruption and the expansion of *Sharia*. Thereby Afghanistan will be less western than the western interveners would have liked. Without this concession the *Taliban* could be tempted to sit out the eighteen months until the beginning of the American withdrawal in the expectation of a later victory.

Norms Tradeoffs

Christia and Semple envision an arrangement between the government and the leadership of the insurgents that could end the civil war and smooth the return of the insurgents to civilian life. Just what this agreement would look like must be left to the Afghans who themselves must negotiate, support and accept it. The West should support them in this by convincing the neighbouring and powerful regional states of the advantages of such an attempt at pacification through agreements.

Option 4: Placing legitimate statehood in the centre

**State
development as a
strategy**

The present Afghanistan policy has not failed because of military weakness, but because it was not clearly conceived and is based on support of an increasingly illegitimate, rudimentary Afghan state. Instead of the militarily fixated question of whether the troops should be strengthened or withdrawn rapidly, what belongs at the heart of the debate is whether and how the state vacuum can successfully be filled.

Currently the international troops are both stabilizing and destabilizing. They cannot be defeated by the insurgents, but also cannot defeat them. From a peace policy point of view they are ultimately of secondary importance. However negotiations with the insurgents also only gain time; they will not lead to a sustainable peace at a national level in the foreseeable future. The violent actors are too numerous, the political scene is too fragmented and the control of the leaders over their fighters is too limited. Their interests are too divergent and the belief of many violent actors that continued violence is useful for them is too great.

**New functioning
statehood**

A “reconciliation process” also fails to offer any realistic prospect of peace. Within the framework of the new strategy this is merely a euphemism for the weakening and splitting of the insurgents, not a peace policy. This does not, in any way, represent a way to societal reconciliation which currently lacks any basis.

The only imaginable approach to success in the medium term would be the transformation of Afghan statehood into a functioning political entity. Admittedly, the insurgents could not be defeated with this but they could become superfluous; they would wither away. Such a process is cumbersome but, in principle, possible; the military can only have a helping role in this in order to gain time for the overdue political processes and to provide security for it.

**Organize
ownership**

Here lies the key to stability and peace in Afghanistan. How can the paralysis and the discrediting of governmental structures through the omnipresent corruption be successfully reversed? How can war criminals and *warlords* be removed from governmental offices without pushing them into the arms of the insurgents? How can an effective and fair judiciary be developed in Afghanistan – and a clean and functioning police force? How can Afghan ownership of the political process be organized without relinquishing the power to greedy local and regional elites? How can state structures be created in every area and village in a country with a very weak middle class and a limited level of education? Those who cannot give convincing answers are merely using foreign – and Afghan – soldiers to cover up, with violence, the weaknesses and the failures of their own policies. If all these fundamentals were present, then protection of these achievements by the inland and foreign military

would be a credible, justifiable and promising option. Instead the military intervention is suspended in mid air and bypasses the crucial goals of stability and peace in Afghanistan. Because the conditions for a halfway functioning statehood do not yet exist, this is, at the heart, about whether or not they can be established within a reasonable amount of time. After the spirit of optimism in the first election, a great deal of time has been squandered. It is questionable whether a turnaround can still succeed. The basic approach of the international Afghan policy should aim at the promotion of legitimate statehood – compared to this everything else is secondary.

Statehood is pivotal

An international negotiation process between the neighbours and regional powers

For a realistic prospect of peace, Afghanistan needs neighbours and other stakeholders who have an interest in the country's stabilization. The US Secretary of State presented a "Regional Strategy for Stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan" in January 2010. In fact, the neighbouring countries are involved in multiple ways in the Afghan war so they could contribute to stemming the violence in Afghanistan. We encourage initiating an international negotiation process for this purpose. The experiences of the Helsinki process, which succeeded in finding common interests despite antagonistic ideologies, could be adopted. Despite all the divergences of interests Afghanistan's neighbours and the important countries in the region are of one mind: They want to contain the civil war in Afghanistan. Because otherwise the Islamists – all too ready to use violence – could grow stronger in their own countries.

Common Interests

Pakistan is the top priority. The encroachment of the Afghan war is destabilizing this nuclear power; at the same time the growing violence in Pakistan is affecting Afghanistan. We repeat our insistence that the stabilization of Pakistan must have the highest priority for the West. Merely to demand that Islamabad limit the possibilities for retreat for the *Taliban* is not enough. The relationships, especially in the tribal areas, are much too complicated for this. In addition, with the increase in political pressure, there is a risk of further exacerbating the internal conflicts which could endanger nothing less than its existence. It is much more about persuading Pakistan to apply a moderating influence to the Pashtun insurgents. It definitely has some leverage for this, not least that a large percentage of their families live in Pakistan.

Concern about Destabilization

Pakistan as a moderating force

India's efforts to gain influence in Afghanistan have their basis in its hostility towards Pakistan. Its greatest contribution to the pacification of Afghanistan would, therefore, be reconciliation with Pakistan. Without the threat from India, the Pakistani military would require fewer resources and domestic power and the importance of the religious extremists would also decline. Both would benefit Pakistan's domestic stability.

India-Pakistan Reconciliation

Iran is a possible partner for and a potential interference in an international negotiation process. Teheran provides – and this is seldom valued - development aid in the province of Herat, close to its border, both for combating drugs and as humanitarian aid for refugees. At the same time it supports the party of the Afghan Shiites and *warlords*. Were the USA finally to decide to resume diplomatic relations

Negotiate directly with Iran

with Teheran again and to negotiate directly with it, this would make its constructive participation easier.

Involve Russia and China

Last but not least *Russia* and the *Central Asian States* are interested in Afghanistan not becoming, once again, a sanctuary for radical Islamists and transnational terrorists, which would then threaten their countries. Ultimately *China*, which meanwhile is the largest foreign investor in Afghanistan, should also let itself to be won over for this goal. German foreign policy should, moreover, use indirect communication channels to the insurgents, i.e. through UN representatives or third states such as Saudi Arabia. However, with all of these efforts for a regional stability initiative one should not lose sight of the fact that they can only promote and support the pacification of Afghanistan.

Foster channels of communication

From Civil War to Political Competition?

Wars between states have become the exception, but not insurgencies and civil wars. They often go on for years and sometimes claim more victims than wars, weigh heavily on the civilian population and are particularly difficult to end. During them, both sides denounce their opponent as the incarnation of evil, persecute any protest in their own camp as treachery and try to forge victim myths in order to create ammunition from the suffering of the war in order to continue it. The dead, who cannot object, are especially suited to legitimate further murders.

Violence limits leeway

With on-going systematic use of violence, the victory over the enemy, the cohesion of one's own group, physical and political survival or the prevention of a defeat emerge in place of the original agenda. Violence taking on a life of its own appreciably limits the leeway for compromises. Thus, non-state violent actors rightly get more and more attention in the realms of politics and scholarship. How can they and their state opponents be turned into political opponents, competitors or even partners in cooperation? This is the question at the heart of this year's Peace Report.

Multifaceted violence

Two factors complicate the analysis and the political dealings with non-state violent actors. For one thing, they cannot all be tarred with the same brush: The term includes national liberation movements, ethno-national secession movements, terror groups, rebels against a national government, *Jihadist* fighters, resistance groups against foreign occupiers, *warlords*, tribal militias, drug cartels and other networks of organized crime, youth gangs, death squads and vigilante groups, to mention only the most important groups of actors. Their violence is extremely diverse; it ranges from throwing stones to the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, from bomb attacks, kidnappings, assassinations and assaults to quasi-military operations.

Illegitimate States

For another, viewing such violent actors in isolation is misleading. Even though they mostly turn against state power, they are not, per se, illegitimate. Such state-centeredness leads to the false conclusion that one must merely weaken or eliminate the non-state violent actors and then the problem is solved. Yet all too frequently, the states against which they are fighting have no more legitimacy than the groups which confront them violently.

Violent Actors do not fall from the Sky

The emancipation of most of today's countries occurred through wars, revolutions and secessions and from George Washington right up to Nelson Mandela there have been many well respected statesmen who once began their careers as non-state violent actors. In the resistance against the Nazis as well, non-state violent actors, whose moral rectitude is beyond dispute, were also involved. In addition, this should not be seen out of proportion: The many hundreds of millions of dead claimed by the terrible 20th Century with all its wars and mass murders, were primarily the doing of states. Their capacity for destruction considerably outstrips all the potential of other violent actors.

Not all violent actors are terrorists

Non-state violent actors must be understood and judged in their political and societal context. To combat them as enemies, without any differentiation, means indiscriminately equating totally different actors – “at night all cats are grey” goes the common expression – and right from the start denies that their concerns could have any reasonable motivation or justification. Moreover their violence may definitely go hand in hand with non-violent practices and noteworthy social involvement. Whoever denounces non-state violent actors across-the-board as terrorists frequently supports violent state actors and eliminates potential partners for peace negotiations.

Armed groups are mostly propelled by a mixture of expectations of winning, political calculation and ideological motives. Their violence is intended to secure their own survival, to force through their own notions of values or order, to control their own group or to change an order that they find unjust. By comparison to violent state actors, they have fewer resources available and thus they espouse asymmetrical forms of violence to deal with their concerns, through, for example, symbolic actions, guerrilla tactics or terror attacks.

Grievances promote violence

Non-state violent actors – apart from purely criminal organizations – mostly become politically relevant where they take on and denounce serious domestic conflicts or the exclusion of entire populations groups from the political system. Otherwise a social foundation is lacking and their violence seldom exceeds a level which the police can control. Political violence only becomes a real challenge when segments of the society find it justifiable. This assumes inequities but also the conviction that there is no alternative to violence. Only when other forms of resistance have proven to be ineffective, does political violence become a sustained option.

Changing violent actors by changing the state

In order that violent actors may again become the political opposition, the underlying conflict must be transformed. Thereby societal *and* state violence must be addressed: It is seldom enough to hold violent actors at bay or to have them share power. Mostly a fundamental reform of the state and society is necessary. Parallel structures supported by corruption and nepotism perpetuate the perception of a weak state without legitimacy. Examples of this are Nigeria, the Sudan, the North Caucasus and

Fundamental Reforms

Colombia. Population groups which were hitherto marginalized or whose survival was threatened, need effective, non-partisan statehood, territorial or personal autonomy and economic prospects. Only this can deprive the self-proclaimed militant protectors of their basis for legitimacy. By contrast, sheer repression mostly achieves the opposite.

Turkey-PKK De-escalation

In Turkey the liberalization of state structures and the cautious change of the Kurdish policy have contributed to de-escalation. The demands of the party represented in Parliament, the Party for a Democratic Society (DTP), for dialogue, recognition of the Kurdish identity, minority rights, the end of violence and a general amnesty correspond with the goals which countless non-state violent actors in other regions have taken up. The renunciation of violence offered by the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) and the gradual guaranteeing of cultural rights for the Kurds offer starting points for ending the civil war and the transformation of a violent movement.

South Africa: Sanctions were helpful

The transformation of non-state violent actors often requires that the state transform itself from a partisan, corrupt, repressive or incompetent body into a functioning political body that all segments of the population accept. It must, therefore, achieve legitimacy at the cost of the violent actors and precisely there where it has been met - not without reason - with fear, contempt or mistrust. In modern states the government achieves its legitimacy solely from the consent of the ruled. Where they only ensure the rule of small elites over the whole, the suppression of any opposition, whether it is peaceable or acts violently, is their only option. Supporting such regimes in their battle against any internal change is fatal because they themselves are the problem, not the solution. The decisions of the UN for sanctions against the Apartheid regime, which, for its part, bolstered the African National Congress, are a showcase for successful support – also of violent resistance groups.

Victorious Military Peace: A fragile achievement

Under certain circumstances, non-state violent actors can be forced into capitulation through excessive and indiscriminate military means. This is happening in Sri Lanka and Chechen. In May 2009 the government in Sri Lanka ended 25 years of perpetual civil war with the Tamil Liberation Tigers (LTTE) which had claimed some 150,000 lives. Yet this victorious peace has not rectified the causes of the conflict. It may achieve short term successes, but the quest for revenge or reversal of the defeat may hinder enduring peace. Furthermore, it demands too high a price – in Sri Lanka during the final phase of the war, between 20,000 and 40,000 combatants and around 25,000 civilians were killed. A violent forced renunciation of armed combat by the vanquished seldom succeeds. A year after the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka it is too early for prognoses. But as the escalation of violence in the North Caucasus shows, it would not be the first time that the declared end of hostilities soon proved to be merely an interruption. The Russian variant of “the War on Terror” in Chechen promotes the radicalization of non-state violent actors: the denunciation of any resistance as terrorism has led to the secular ethno-nationalistic violent actors

Violence merely interrupted

transforming themselves into Islamic violent actors and expanding their radius of action to other republics in the North Caucasus.

Power Sharing: A Reward for Violent Actors?

Another approach attempts to persuade violent actors, through selective concessions and the offers of power-sharing, to give up their military power in favor of having a political say. Prominent examples are the peace agreement between North and South Sudan and the *power sharing* in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Power sharing can bring about a ceasefire but can also lead to state and non-state violent actors securing their power in joint sort of camaraderie. The demand to lay down weapons before negotiations is doomed to failure without reliable security guarantees. The postwar order must, in addition, avoid cementing ethnic and religious divisions. The experiences in Iraq show that: The fragmentation there is arguably the most important obstacle to a stable state.

Power sharing

Sharing power can set peace processes in motion which point the way out of the civil war. The participation of the *Hezbollah* in the Parliament and government of Lebanon does not, in fact, offer any guarantee against a relapse into civil war, but increases the costs for the *Hezbollah* and offers incentives to limit domestic competition to the political and social arena. Frequently, however, democratic deficits, patronage, ethnic clientelism, corruption, the political endorsement of military victories and the weakening of the state are connected with it. Thus power sharing can make a peace agreement possible, but can also conceal the germ for a new escalation of violence. Moreover, there is the moral dilemma that the former violent actors are being rewarded.

Cemented divisions

Power sharing is viewed as attractive by the warring parties when, through it, they can avoid all far-reaching reforms of the political and societal structures and can profit from it. Violent actors without scruples then construct a joint, fragile rule over the rest of the society and prevent sustainable peace.

Don't reward violent actors

Divide and conquer: Isolating the Troublemakers

Using the old device *divide et impera*, an attempt is sometimes made to divide moderate from radical elements of a militant group. Driving a wedge between moderates and fundamentalists is intended to loosen the cohesion of the violent actors and weaken them. However this strategy often deprives the extremists of the influence of the moderates and creates *spoilers* out of the schismatic fringes of militant groups. In addition, this is mostly not about a peace strategy but rather about a tactical attempt to win the war. The attempts at reintegration of *Taliban* fighters belong in this category.

Division can exacerbate violence

Columbia did, indeed, improve security with its demobilization and reintegration program, but the victims of the civil war felt they had been treated unjustly because the crimes of the paramilitaries were covered by the amnesty. Thus the mistrust of the paramilitaries remains high and acceptance in the society is limited. Reintegration should not just assist the perpetrators out of fear of renewed

Goal: Reconciliation

escalation, but must make an effort at reconciliation between the parties to the conflict.

Seeking dialogue

Hardliners too especially need incentives for negotiation if one wants to soften their positions. This applies to state and non-state parties to the conflict. In Israel and Palestine the policy of isolating the – democratically elected – *Hamas* did not shake their position of power but on the contrary strengthened the violent resistance. By contrast to this, the group *Gama'a Islamiya* in Egypt renounced violence after the state began to talk with them and ended the isolation of their members and leaders. This shows that Islamic violent actors can also be integrated and transformed under certain conditions; there are, in fact, frequently examples of Islamists being further radicalized as a result of state repression – in Yemen, for instance.

Negotiated solutions

Using War-Weariness

One way to settle intrastate violent conflicts can be a negotiated solution. However this presumes a mutual interest and the ability to obligate one's own armed supporters to keep such an agreement. As a rule, a negotiated solution only moves into the realm of possibility when both sides have to come to the realization that their goals cannot be achieved violently. The examples of South Africa and Tajikistan show that war-weariness and the pressure of civil society can hit a nerve with the parties to the conflict and make the continuation of a civil war more difficult. Conversely this promotes dialogue and thereby the transformation of the antagonists if their politicians take on national responsibility and gain prestige from the role of peacemaker. Negotiated solutions often succeed with the help of external brokers who are prepared to oversee and safeguard the implementation and adherence to the peace agreement. Such an agreement can only bring about sustainable peace when it tackles the causes of the violence.

External Brokers

Peace Policy Goal: Transformation of non-state violent actors

We urge making the ending of wars and violent conflicts between governments and non-state violent actors a central task of current peace policy. Since such conflicts can, as a rule, only be ended militarily with the use of excessive force and at the price of a high number of victims; this should not be the model. Instead we suggest, in a nutshell, sticking to the following three strategies:

Compromises

1. A peace agreement through negotiated compromises. Here either common rules of play for future interactions with each other or a formal power sharing can be laid down.

Security guarantees and social incentives

2. The separation and partial societal reintegration of the former opponent as long as he has legitimacy in the society. This presumes security guarantees as well as material and social incentives.

Tackle the causes

3. Overcoming the causes for war and violence. As a rule, this means far-reaching reforms in the state and society in order to be able to guarantee or increase legal and political equality, to rectify injustice and strengthen the possibilities for participation. A functioning administration and an efficient legal system are important for this. This way is the one requiring the most effort, but it promises the most sustainable success.

Reforms

In many ways, the third approach is the condition for the first two mentioned. Separation and partial reintegration of the violent actors is more likely to succeed the more legitimacy the state and societal context has. Peace through compromise is also more likely when repression and marginalization decline and the possibilities for participation and equity increase.

Don't demonize opponents

Whatever approach may be chosen: None of them goes along with the demonization of the respective opponent if he has a social basis at his disposal. Non-state violent actors are the symptom; the illnesses are the conditions which create them. At the same time, we do not close our eyes to the fact that there are non-state violent actors with whom no peace can be concluded because they block every peaceful solution for material, political or ideological reasons. They are not negotiating partners but need to be de-legitimized, socially isolated and combated through reforms. Limiting their economic power base and their ideological influence on their surroundings can also narrow their range of action. A transformation of civil wars and violent conflicts can only succeed when both non-state violent actors as well as the state and society change.

Conflict transformation

Implementing the Vision of a Nuclear-Free World

The Iranian Nuclear Program – New Approaches are Needed

Iran is suspected of developing nuclear weapons. To be sure, the government in Teheran gives assurances that their nuclear program is for civilian purposes only, but these assertions are not especially believable. The International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) has many times discovered nuclear activities in Iran which have been kept secret. Iran's nuclear ambitions, insofar as they serve the autonomy of the country with the provision of nuclear fuel for civilian purposes, are shared by the bulk of the population including the opposition. Yet the rank and file is driven by completely different questions: reforms, rights of freedom and democratization. The West does, in fact, sympathize with these demands, but the community of states is, first and foremost, looking for options to prevent an Iranian bomb. The expectation that the possession of nuclear weapons would keep opponents from attacking was, as is well-known, at the bottom of the deterrence peace in the Cold War. Now nuclear aspirants are also invoking this calculation for themselves. The *regime change* in Iraq forced by war, definitely lent this a certain rationality.

Secret Nuclear Activities

Regional Powder Keg

The clock is ticking because the closer Iran gets to having a nuclear bomb, the more likely it becomes that Israel – itself an undeclared nuclear state - will go through with its threats of a preventive attack. Some of Iran's Arab neighbours could also consider procuring their own nuclear capability should Iran become nuclear weapons-

capable. A further tightening of the sanctions which have been in place since 1979 do not have very good prospects for success; they have not, up to now, dissuaded Teheran from pursuing its nuclear weapons' program. Moreover sanctions mostly do not affect the rulers but rather the people. They could even weaken the Iranian democracy movement since the Revolutionary Guards control the Iranian black market.

Sanctions not very promising

Suggestions to internationalize Iran's fuel cycle have been on the table for a long while. Under international control, the military use of nuclear technology would be impossible. Yet Iran's government tries to use the international hand-wringing over its nuclear program to diminish the domestic pressure for reform. Moreover it mobilizes the deep-seated worries about military intervention – thereby, whether this would do away with the regime or destroy the nuclear facilities is secondary.

Recognize Iran's stability policy

We recommend seizing on Iran's interest in stability in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Iran feels itself threatened by Sunni *Jihadists* and insurgents, for example in Balochistan. The community of states should recognize the services that Iran has rendered in dealing with the flood of refugees from Afghanistan and in combating the drugs trade. That does not mean closing our eyes to the support of the Lebanese *Hezbollah* or ignoring the menacing threats of the Iranian president against Israel. But it could make the criticism of it more credible and substitute differentiation for the black-white thinking about Teheran.

Renunciation of violence

The concentrated military might of the USA in the region appears threatening and keeps alive the traumatic experience of 1953 in Iran as the USA toppled the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh. Security gains would possibly ease the renunciation of nuclear weapons capability for Teheran. Needed would be a clear message from Washington, that the USA does not intend a violent regime change and the resumption of diplomatic relations broken off in 1979: Finally we consider a clear warning to Israel to be necessary: A military attack against Iran would be a dangerous rogue action, which would not be accepted by the West.

Resume relations

Global Zero – Practical Steps

Protection against nuclear terrorism

With his vision of a nuclear weapons' free world, President Obama signaled a change in course from that of his predecessor who cancelled international treaties on arms control and damaged the non-proliferation regime. Obama draws the logical conclusions from the reappraisal of the threat situation. The risk of an unintended nuclear escalation or a nuclear accident continues; the pressure to proliferate has grown as a result of the unofficial nuclear powers and the Iranian nuclear program. Above all, however, the risk of a nuclear terrorist attack has increased dramatically according to the assessment of the American security establishment. It is, indeed, a nightmare that even a fraction of the 2,300 tons of plutonium available world-wide, which would be sufficient for the construction of 200,000 nuclear bombs, cannot be adequately safeguarded from unauthorized access.

Deterrence aims at thin air

The risk of a nuclear terrorist attack cannot be overcome with traditional deterrence because the threat of nuclear retaliation has no addressees: Who should be bombed? So letting radioactive material or even a bomb itself fall into the hands of

terrorists must be prevented. The less there is in circulation worldwide, the lower are the risks of nuclear terrorism. Moreover, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) can only prevent the nuclear have-nots from reaching for the bomb, when the official nuclear powers – as foreseen in the agreement – reduce their arsenals. This reduction must fall significantly below the upper limits in the new START Treaty between Russia and the USA – which ends the arms control policy Ice Age.

START is just the beginning

On the way to a nuclear-free world there are complicated problems to solve: watertight verification, effective circumvention of breaches of the agreement and a more efficient limitation and reduction of conventional arms, the significance of which may well grow in proportion to the disappearance of nuclear weapons. The NATO countries need to eliminate nuclear weapons from their security and military doctrines.

Germany has no nuclear weapons and is a member in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But it participates in the “nuclear sharing” of NATO, is the deployment country for tactical nuclear weapons and is a close ally of the three nuclear weapons states, France, Great Britain and the USA. We recommend that the [German] Federal government press the EU and NATO to have all tactical US nuclear weapons withdrawn from Germany unconditionally. NATO and the [German] government still refuse to make public the number of US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. However, transparency is a precondition for disarmament.

Withdraw nuclear weapons

EU for non-proliferation

It is an encouraging signal that the USA made known the extent of its nuclear arsenal at the NPT Review Conference in May. According to the German Defense Minister, the nuclear weapons stationed in Germany serve to give Germany a voice in NATO – in reality they are not of much use in negotiation poker. They are obsolete, dangerous and must be destroyed. The [German] Federal Government should, therefore, attempt to win over the Central European states and Turkey to this view in the debate on a new strategy concept for NATO. Within the framework of the NPT it should argue for a renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons and the principle that nuclear weapons should only be allowed to be stationed on the territory of the owner countries

At the end of March 2010, the European Council, in the outline of its position for the NPT Review Conference, emphasized the relevance of disarmament for non-proliferation. Moreover, the EU plans to do more for non-proliferation in the joint Foreign and Security Policy; thus it wants to press its trade and cooperation partners to commit themselves to a stricter non-proliferation policy. Germany should insist on a *Global Zero* European Action Plan to consolidate such activities. France, in particular, must be persuaded to go along with nuclear disarmament. Then the EU could become the motor for a nuclear free world.

European Action Plan: Global Zero

Security Policy Consequences of the World Economic Crisis

The world economic crisis has affected the old industrialized states more seriously than the dynamic emerging countries or new industrialized countries; even fragile states are less affected by the declining grow rates than the countries of Europe and North America. Nevertheless, the danger in the fragile states of a violent conflict

The situation of the poor has worsened

Support women and family farmers

escalation is especially high as a result of the world economic crisis. Their state apparatus is as weak as their economies, their social security systems are undeveloped and their societies are fragmented and poor. Due to the world economic crisis, living conditions in fragile states are becoming worse for the majority of the population while the state leeway for sharing resources shrinks and the potential for domestic conflict grows. One indication of this is the unsatisfactory implementation of the *Millennium Development Goals*: The situation of the poorest of the poor has become even worse.

Improved education

What can be done? The markets in the fragile states should be protected from cheap imports through changed WTO regulations. It would be a noticeable relief if the agricultural products of the OECD states were not subsidized. Moreover, the promotion of small farm enterprises and small-scale markets is also urgent for the development of rural areas.

Educational options also must be improved and expanded with special promotional measures for women, above all with respect to land rights, inheritance rights and the availability of credit. At a global level, voting rights in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should be decoupled from the level of payments so that poor countries are no longer completely at the mercy of the decisions of the rich ones. Finally, the old promise to raise development financing to 0.7 percent of the national income should be kept. It has been said - and written - that 11,400 billion US dollars have been raised to cope with the global economic and financial crisis – so the argument that there are no resources is not convincing.

Strengthen Weak States

Crisis leads to unrest

A hard-nosed security calculation forbids leaving the particularly weak members of the community to their own devices with the consequences of the crisis. Where the social situation has become worse, it can be expected that the disappointment with the state will increase and the rifts between the groups in society will become deeper. Scarce food supplies caused by more limited household income and increasing prices raise the social tensions. As a result of the food crisis of 2007/2008, there was increased social and political unrest in 39 countries. In view of declining state funds, weak states are overwhelmed. A slump in exports, declining incomes and additional state indebtedness limit their latitude for problem-solving and distribution measures. As a result such administrations lose the ability to deal with social grievances. Ensuring security is also more difficult when the police and the military no longer get their salaries.

Weapons trade agreement

Buying weapons may make it possible in the short term to react repressively to the crisis phenomena and to keep social protest under control; however, they are not much help in combating poverty. A binding weapons trade agreement would create international legal standards for assessing buying, selling and transit transactions. Germany currently holds the chairmanship of an expert group that is tasked with developing recommendations on how the UN can improve reports on military expenditures. Berlin should support efforts to control the proliferation of conventional weapons with the help of a world-wide arms trade agreement.

Economic support

Among the countless fragile states, six countries are suffering to a very particular degree from the consequences of the world economic crisis: the Central African Republic, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Yemen and Burundi. The risk of conflict has significantly increased in these countries. These should be counteracted with a combination of economic support, social cushioning of the consequences of the crisis and strengthening of local government competencies.

In light of today's porous borders, the potential for violence – also in geostrategically less important states – should be taken seriously. The development of robust state institutions should be promoted – what happens when this is neglected can be observed in Afghanistan.

Christiane Fröhlich

Margret Johannsen

Bruno Schoch

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder

Jochen Hippler